

# 2015 National Network of Fusion Centers

## Final Report

April 2016





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# Executive Summary

In the years following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, state and local governments—supported by significant federal investment—established the National Network of Fusion Centers (National Network). Today, 78 independent fusion centers spread across the United States and its territories collaborate and share information, making the National Network a national asset.

The 2007 National Strategy for Information Sharing noted that “interlinking and networking [the fusion centers] will create a national capacity to gather, process, analyze, and share information.” Housed among state and local law enforcement and emergency management agencies, fusion centers have unique access to systems, information, and frontline police and first responders that cannot be replicated by the federal government. This access, combined with their operational independence from the federal government, allow fusion centers to provide homeland security partners—at all levels—with a distinctive perspective on threats within their state or locality, contributing to a more comprehensive national threat picture.

Through strong coordination and collaboration, the fusion centers and federal homeland security partners share their unique information and expertise to fill intelligence gaps. The result is a security force multiplier that helps strengthen and protect the homeland from all manner of threats.

The Fusion Center Performance Program (FCPP) evaluates fusion centers’ achievement of capabilities critical to the fusion process, as well as selected performance measures. It also strives to ensure functional consistency across the National Network, regardless of fusion center size, scope, geography or mission.

As a result of the steady success since 2011, the 2015 Fusion Center Assessment (2015 Assessment) serves as a closeout of the capabilities-based measures.

This 2015 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report (2015 Final Report) provides the results of the 2015 Assessment for the period from August 1, 2014 to September 30, 2015. It summarizes the FCPP findings on the

capabilities and performance of the National Network and recaps its progress since 2011, setting the stage for transition to a performance-focused assessment.

Highlights from 2011-2015 include:

- **National Network average capability score is 98 out of 100.** The assessment comprises attributes that are critical to successful execution of the fusion process, regardless of the size, scope, geography, or mission of a fusion center. The average score across the National Network increased, up to 98.0 from 96.3 in 2014 and 76.8 in 2011. The near-perfect achievement indicates functional consistency in fusion centers across the National Network.
- **Achievement of Mature stage.** The 2015 Assessment found that the National Network has successfully reached the “Mature” stage under the National Network Maturity Model, signifying the network of fusion centers has the full capability to leverage the collective resources among individual fusion centers and adjust to both the changing threat environment and evolving requirements.
- **All fusion centers have foundational plans, policies, or standard operating procedures (SOPs).** Foundational documentation is necessary to guide operations, enabling fusion centers to execute the fusion process consistently over time and under a variety of circumstances. For two consecutive years, all fusion centers have approved plans, policies, or SOPs for each of the four Critical Operational Capabilities and a privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties policy.
- **Key customers’ satisfaction with fusion center products and services continues to improve.** Homeland Security Advisors, heads of state police and investigative agencies, major city police chiefs and major county sheriffs, state emergency management directors, and Special Agents in Charge at Federal Bureau of Investigation field offices rely on fusion center products and services. Satisfaction increased across all of these key customers, with overall customer satisfaction increasing from 68.7% to 74.3%. The most significant gain was found in survey participants reporting that fusion center products and services influenced their decision-making related to threat response activities, increasing from 59.7% to 70.9%.

Going forward, we are now able to transition to a new performance framework that demonstrates the impact and value of the National Network, highlighting successes and identifying areas of growth. Since 2012, performance data has been collected to determine the impact of National Network operations on protecting the homeland. Building on that effort, a group of Fusion Center Directors worked with the Department of Homeland Security to develop a new framework that balances data sensitivities with the need to demonstrate performance, including what data is collected and how it is collected. This new framework will center on a limited number of performance metrics by which the progress, strengths and weaknesses of the National Network can be measured. Working from the solid foundation of mature capabilities, this focused performance measures approach going forward will enable fusion centers to concentrate their energy and resources to maximize their role as a focal point within the state and local environment for the receipt, analysis, gathering and sharing of threat-related information.

# Methodology

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) worked closely with federal and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) partners and homeland security and public safety associations to collect data to evaluate the capability and performance of the National Network during the period from August 1, 2014 to September 30, 2015. Capability and performance data was collected through the 2015 Assessment, fusion center-focused exercises and drills, external surveys, and directly from partner agencies.

## 2015 Fusion Center Assessment

In 2011, DHS, in coordination with its interagency partners, designed a structured approach for assessing the National Network.<sup>1</sup> This approach includes a standardized assessment and scoring methodology for individual fusion centers that accounts for both the complex operational realities of fusion centers and the strategic imperatives of national and homeland security priorities. It also enables DHS to report on the capabilities and performance of individual fusion centers and the National Network as a whole at specific points in time, as well as changes over time. All but one of the 78 designated<sup>2</sup> fusion centers that constituted the National Network as of October 1, 2015 completed the 2015 Assessment.

As in previous years, the primary data collection mechanism for the 2015 Assessment was an Online Self Assessment Tool. This year the tool included 128 multiple-choice and “yes/no” questions and 10 data tables. The questions and tables addressed individual fusion center capability attributes, National Network Maturity Model attributes, and performance measures. The majority of the questions were repeated from previous assessments, although some were simplified and a limited number of new questions were added.

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<sup>1</sup> A full glossary of terms used for the 2015 Assessment can be found at <http://www.dhs.gov/publication/2015-fusion-center-assessment>.

<sup>2</sup> The Federal Resource Allocation Criteria policy (Information Sharing Environment Guidance ISE-G-112) defines the process by which states and territories designate fusion centers and defines objective criteria to be used by federal departments and agencies making resource allocation decisions regarding fusion centers.

In addition to attribute-related questions, Fusion Center Directors were asked about the effectiveness of federal support received over the previous 14 months, as well as expected needs for the next 12 months. Finally, Fusion Center Directors were asked to answer questions and fill in data tables addressing cross-cutting capabilities,<sup>3</sup> operational costs, and demographic information.

## Fusion Center Scoring and Individual Reports

Within each of the Critical Operational Capabilities (COC) or Enabling Capabilities (EC), individual attributes were assigned standard point values based on a simple calculation of the total possible COC or EC score divided by the total number of COC or EC attributes. Attributes are distributed unequally across the COCs and ECs because of the differing levels of complexity for each of the capabilities. As a result, the value of an attribute within each COC or EC varies.

To calculate COC and EC scores, the total number of attributes achieved within a COC or an EC was multiplied by the standard point value for the COC and EC. Individual COC and EC scores were then combined to determine the fusion center's total score. Individual fusion center scores were based on a 100-point scale, with the four COCs worth up to 20 points each ( $4 \times 20 = 80$ ) and the four ECs worth five points each ( $4 \times 5 = 20$ ).<sup>4</sup>

Each fusion center received a 2015 Individual Report that detailed its overall score and included specific information on its achievement of the attributes aligned with each of the four COCs and the four ECs. The 2015 Individual Report also included a one-page comparison between the fusion center's 2014 and 2015 Assessment scores.

## Fusion Center Readiness Initiative

Through the Fusion Center Readiness Initiative (FCRI), DHS conducts fusion center-focused drills and exercises, provides exercise-related tools and subject matter expertise to fusion centers, and facilitates fusion center participation in prevention-focused exercises hosted by other agencies. As part of the FCRI, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) conducts an annual communications drill to test the National Network's ability to access and share information from the federal government. In 2015, the following were tested:

- Fusion center unclassified e-mail systems
- Homeland Security Information Network Intelligence Community of Interest (HSIN-Intel)
- Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN)
- Secure telephone equipment and the classified audio bridge
- Secure video teleconference system

A total of 77 fusion centers participated in the 2015 Communications Drill to assist in operational preparedness and to evaluate implementation of COC 1 – Receive. Each fusion center received an after-action report detailing its results. Data from the 2015 Communications Drill was used to validate data collected through the 2015 Assessment.

## External Surveys

DHS worked with partner agencies to identify fusion center customers and group them into categories reflecting common requirements and perspectives. One of these groups—defined as “key customers”—includes state and territorial Homeland Security Advisors; the heads of state police agencies, state investigative agencies, and state emergency management agencies; major city police chiefs; major county sheriffs; and representatives from Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field offices. DHS coordinated with the National Governors Association (NGA), the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), the Association of State Criminal Investigative Agencies (ASCIA), the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA), the Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCCA), the Major

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<sup>3</sup> Cross-cutting capabilities account for fusion center operational or programmatic functions that support multiple COCs and/or ECs or that relate to but do not cleanly align with a single COC and/or EC.

<sup>4</sup> Questions and responses relating to cross-cutting topics are not included in individual fusion center scoring.



County Sheriffs Association (MCSA), and the Special Agent in Charge at every FBI field office to conduct an annual survey of these customers to gauge their perspectives and solicit feedback on a wide range of topics related to the fusion center(s) within their respective areas of responsibility. A total of 158 individuals responded to the surveys.

## Partner Agencies

Federal partners provided a wide variety of information to support the development of this report. The primary source is the FY 2015 Federal Cost Inventory, which is a catalog of all federal personnel, related costs, and programmatic support being provided to the National Network. A total of 43 federal agencies that provide resources or services to support fusion centers participated in the data call. In addition, DHS sought input from authoritative federal sources for relevant contextual information relating to specific performance categories, when available. For instance, the Federal Emergency Management Agency provided lists of federally declared disasters and the DHS Office of Operations Coordination and Planning provided a list of National Special Security Events and other events that received a Special Events Assessment Rating. The FBI also provided data on fusion center access to FBI-sponsored classified systems, fusion center collocation with FBI entities, and FBI investigations initiated or enhanced based on fusion center information.

## Data Validation

Following the close of the Online Self Assessment Tool, DHS conducted validation activities starting in November 2015. Validation teams conducted detailed reviews of individual fusion center submissions to identify errors and inconsistencies and to minimize data discrepancies. Following these reviews, DHS conducted structured interviews with Fusion Center Directors and staff to address any identified issues and to gather clarifying information, as necessary. Both during and after each interview, DHS provided Fusion Center Directors with proposed changes to their 2015 Assessment submissions based on the interview discussions, and Fusion Center Directors were given the opportunity to accept, reject, or otherwise comment on each item before any changes were finalized. Fusion Center Directors were afforded a final opportunity for review once the 2015 Individual Reports were issued.

# Findings

This section takes a closer look at the results of the 2015 Fusion Center Assessment (2015 Assessment) itself. It includes highlights of the capabilities and performance measures for 2015 compared with 2014, as well as key demographic information. This information focuses on key statistics about the National Network of Fusion Centers (National Network) and its recent progress in this capstone year of the capabilities element of the Fusion Center Performance Program (FCPP).

## History and Transition

Led by the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment, in 2010 fusion center partners conducted the first measurement of fusion centers' capability: "The 2010 Baseline Capabilities Assessment (BCA)." Having increased their numbers and capabilities dramatically since 2001, the BCA's objectives were to: understand the fusion centers' maturity; use the collected data to enhance federal support to achieve and maintain the fusion centers' capability; and identify capability gaps and establish strategic priorities.

In 2011, DHS and its interagency partners established the FCPP to capture objective, standardized data that describes the value and impact of the individual fusion centers and the National Network as a whole in supporting national information sharing and homeland security outcomes<sup>5</sup>. Since that time, DHS has conducted the Assessment annually, measuring the National Network's progress toward achieving the COCs and ECs. In 2012 the FCPP evolved to include performance measures at the Network level.

As a result of the steady improvement since 2011, the 2015 Assessment serves as a closeout of COC and EC measures. This 2015 Final Report provides the results of the 2015 Assessment and a recap of the National Network's progress since 2011, setting the stage for a performance-focused assessment.

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<sup>5</sup> The Federal Resource Allocation Criteria policy (Information Sharing Environment Guidance ISE-G-112) defines the process by which states and territories designate fusion centers and defines objective criteria to be used by federal departments and agencies making resource allocation decisions regarding fusion centers.

# 2015 National Network Overview

## General

The following is an overview of the composition of the National Network<sup>6</sup> as of September 30, 2015. The total number of fusion centers remained at 78; all but one of which participated in the 2015 Assessment. Fifty-three fusion centers operate at the state or territorial level, meaning that their areas of responsibility (AORs) encompass the entirety of these states or territories. The remaining 25 fusion centers operate within major urban areas, meaning that their AORs typically encompass smaller geographic areas in and around cities. The average fusion center has been in existence for 9 years.

Based on mission requirements and available resources, fusion center business hours vary across the National Network:

- Twenty fusion centers operate 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
- Eighteen fusion centers have extended operating hours, typically over 10 hours a day or more than 5 days a week, but less than 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
- Thirty-nine fusion centers operate only during core business hours, typically 10 hours or less a day, 5 days a week.

This represents a minor shift since 2014, with four fusion centers changing their operations from 24/7 or extended hours to core business hours only.

## Collocation with Partner Agencies

The 2015 Assessment data indicates a significant amount of collocation across the National Network, with 89.6% (69) of fusion centers located either in the same office space or building with at least one other federal or SLTT agency. Table 1 presents the instances of reported collocation by agency type.

Table 1: Collocation of Fusion Centers with Other Entities

Entities	# of Fusion Centers		%
	2014	2015	Change
<b>Collocated with one or more partners, including:</b>	66	69	4.5%
<b>State, county, or city law enforcement</b>	39	40	2.6%
<b>State, county, or city law enforcement intelligence unit</b>	22	28	27.3%
<b>State, county, or city emergency operations center</b>	19	21	10.5%
<b>State homeland security agency</b>	18	19	5.6%
<b>State, county, or city emergency management agency</b>	19	20	5.3%
<b>FBI (field offices, JTTFs, and/or FIGs)</b>	14	12	-14.3%
<b>State, county, or city fire service</b>	10	13	30.0%
<b>State National Guard</b>	8	12	50.0%
<b>High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (ISC or Watch Center)</b>	10	10	0%
<b>Real-time crime center</b>	8	11	37.5%
<b>Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Border Intelligence Center</b>	3	3	0%
<b>RISS Node and/or RISSafe™ Watch Center</b>	3	7	133.3%
<b>Maritime Interagency Operations Center (USCG Sector)</b>	0	0	0%
<b>Other fusion center</b>	4	4	0%

<sup>6</sup> The 78 fusion centers that make up the National Network can be found at: <http://www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-locations-and-contact-information>.

## Fusion Center Staff

Fusion centers reported a total of 2,479 SLTT and private sector staff members working on either a full-time or part-time basis, a decrease of 161 staff members from last year. The median number of fusion center staff members in 2015 was 22 and the average was 32.2, a decrease from 2014 in which the median number of fusion center staff was 24 and the average was 33.8.

As indicated in Table 2, fusion centers reported that analysis was the most common job function across the National Network. Of the 1,113 total analyst positions at fusion centers, 947 were reported occupied and 166 vacant as of September 30, 2015. Fusion centers identified 86 individuals (3.5%) that were deployed to other fusion centers or law enforcement intelligence entities and 94 individuals (3.8%) assigned to a Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, or other federal analytic, intelligence, or investigative entity. This represents a significant increase from the 2014 Assessment period, when 66 individuals (2.5%) were deployed outside their fusion center.

Analyst Experience	
Less than 1 year	22.4%
1 to 2 years	19.2%
2 to 5 years	25.9%
Over 5 years	32.5%

**Table 2: Number of Fusion Center Staff by Level of Government and Function**

	Management & Administration	Analysis	Training & Exercise	Investigative	Legal	Liaison & SME	Other	TOTAL
State	227	625	18	261	6	231	129	1,497
Local	154	300	23	251	1	99	103	931
Tribal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Territorial	2	14	0	0	0	1	0	17
Private Sector	0	8	2	2	1	18	3	34
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>383</b>	<b>947</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>514</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>349</b>	<b>235</b>	<b>2,479</b>

The 2015 Assessment also collected data on SLTT representatives working in fusion centers. Representatives are SLTT personnel whose salaries are not paid out of a fusion center's or its home agency's operating budget but who work at the fusion center on at least a part-time basis. Examples of a representative include a public health nurse assigned to the fusion center as an analyst or a firefighter assigned as a subject matter expert. Collecting data on representatives provides a more complete understanding of the broader contributions made by SLTT agencies. Consistent with the decrease in overall personnel, there was a slight decrease in the number of representatives, with 63 fusion centers identifying a total of 671 representatives (27.1% of all SLTT personnel) working at their centers, compared with 694 representatives (26.3% of all SLTT personnel) in 2014. Representatives support various elements of fusion center operations, with large numbers serving as liaisons/subject matter experts (229, or 34.1%), in investigative roles (154, or 23.0%) and as analysts (157, or 23.4%).

Stability in the key positions of Fusion Center Director, Privacy, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (P/CRCL) Officer, and Security Liaison helps ensure consistent implementation of the fusion process, P/CRCL protections, and information and personnel security. The 2015 Assessment data noted in Table 3 below indicates stability in these key positions.

**Table 3: Experience and Turnover of Key Positions Across National Network**


Function	New to Position in 2013		New to Position in 2014		New to Position in 2015		Average Tenure Years
	#	%	#	%	#	%	
Director	30	38.5%	22	28.2%	32	41.6%	2.5
P/CRCL Officer	19	24.4%	14	17.9%	23	29.9%	3.2
Security Officer	19	24.4%	20	25.6%	28	36.4%	2.8

## Operational Costs

Operational funding for the National Network is provided by a combination of federal, SLTT, and private sector entities. Based on the 2015 Assessment and the 2015 Fusion Center Federal Cost Inventory, total funding for the National Network was \$321.4 million, a 2.1% decrease over last year (see Table 4).

**Table 4: 2015 Fusion Center Federal Cost Inventory**

	Staff	Information Systems & Technology	Training & Exercise	Management & Administration	Programmatic	2015 Totals
Direct Federal Expenditures	\$56,250,000	\$4,210,063	\$4,511,719	\$532,221	\$2,998,220	\$68,502,223
Federal Grants Expended by SLTT Agencies	\$43,978,069	\$12,227,217	\$3,789,569	\$3,712,362	N/A	\$63,707,217
State	\$98,767,581	\$4,479,280	\$390,791	\$4,763,923	N/A	\$108,401,575
Local	\$73,989,700	\$2,259,875	\$831,782	\$2,078,421	N/A	\$79,159,778
Tribal	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	N/A	\$0
Territorial	\$854,324	\$0	\$43,205	\$39,535	N/A	\$937,064
Private Sector	\$722,330	\$0	\$2,500	\$0	N/A	\$724,830
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$274,562,004</b>	<b>\$23,176,435</b>	<b>\$9,569,566</b>	<b>\$11,126,462</b>	<b>\$2,998,220</b>	<b>\$321,432,687</b>



Federal funding used to support fusion centers includes direct federal investment and federal grant funds. Direct federal investments are primarily salaries and benefits for federal personnel assigned to or directly supporting fusion centers but also include federal information technology systems deployed to fusion centers, security clearances sponsored by federal agencies, and training and other resources specifically intended to help fusion centers build and sustain capabilities. In 2015, direct federal investment in fusion centers increased by 0.4% from 2014, to \$68.5 million.

Direct federal investments by federal agency are listed in Table 5.

**Table 5: Direct Support by Federal Agency**

<b>Agency</b>	<b>Direct Federal Expenditures</b>	<b>Percentage of Direct Federal Expenditures</b>	<b>Percentage of National Network Operational Costs</b>
DHS	\$51,559,888	75.3%	16.0%
DOJ	\$15,652,335	22.8%	4.9%
Other agencies	\$1,290,000	1.9%	0.4%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$68,502,223</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>21.3%</b>

Fusion centers used \$63.7 million in federal grant funds<sup>7</sup> during the 2015 Assessment cycle, which represents a decrease of \$9.8 million, or 13.3%, from the previous assessment cycle. The amount of DHS grants funding used by the National Network decreased by more than 12.4%, to \$56.1 million.

SLTT and private sector agencies contributed \$189.2 million (58.9%) of National Network operational funding, a \$2.7 million (1.4%) increase over 2014. When combined with federal grant funds directly controlled by state and local entities, SLTT agencies manage and oversee roughly \$252.9 million (78.7%) of all National Network funding.

At 85.4% of total National Network operational costs, personnel continue to account for the overwhelming majority of all expenditures. This includes a \$630,000 decrease (1.1%) in direct federal expenditures for personnel expenses, a \$3.3 million (6.9%) decrease in federal grants expended by SLTTs on personnel, and an increase of \$4.6 million (2.7%) in state and local agencies' contributions for personnel.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Federal grant dollars are reported by the fusion center and can include funds from more than one grant year.

<sup>8</sup> A total of 62 fusion centers stated that they provided all operational costs.

# 2015 Snapshot: The National Network

Owned and operated by state and local entities, fusion centers serve as focal points for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-related information between the federal government and state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners. Collectively, the capabilities of the National Network of Fusion Centers to conduct analysis and facilitate information sharing help homeland security partners prevent, protect against, and respond to crime and terrorism.



National Network  
Average Overall Score  
**98.0** of 100

National Network  
Maturity Stage

**MATURE**

### Primary Mission


Counterterrorism **96.1%**  
All-crimes **96.1%**  
All-hazards **76.6%**

### Key Customer Satisfaction



**Timeliness** **79.3%**  
**Relevancy** **84.9%**  
**Influence on decision making related to threat response activities** **70.9%**  
**Influence on increased situational awareness of threats** **86.0%**  
**Overall satisfaction** **74.3%**

### National Network Operational Costs



	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Direct Federal	\$97,456,195	\$77,358,662	\$69,653,432	\$68,216,940	\$68,502,223
Federal Grants	\$52,258,930	\$75,269,656	\$65,231,769	\$73,499,366	\$63,707,217
Local	\$34,144,222	\$63,778,109	\$70,304,104	\$71,519,890	\$79,159,778
State	\$83,338,580	\$90,969,473	\$102,150,253	\$113,297,136	\$108,401,575
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$267,197,927</b>	<b>\$308,736,900</b>	<b>\$308,236,242</b>	<b>\$328,286,324</b>	<b>\$321,432,687</b>

The overall funding for the National Network decreased by 2.1% to more than \$321 million, and support by level of government changed considerably from the previous assessment period:



Use of grant funds by fusion centers decreased by 13.3%, from \$73.5 million to \$63.7 million

State expenditures decreased by 4.3%, to \$108.4 million in 2015

Local support for fusion centers increased by 10.7%, to \$79.2 million in 2015

## Staff



- Total SLTT and private sector staff: 2,479
- Fusion center analysts: 947
- New Fusion Center Directors: 32 in 2015, for a total of 107 since 2012
- 27.1% of all SLTT fusion center personnel (i.e., representatives) are funded by partner agencies.
- Fusion centers deployed 86 individuals to other fusion centers or law enforcement intelligence units, an increase of 30.3% from the previous assessment period.


## Federal Personnel Supporting Fusion Centers



Federal Agency	# of Personnel (full-time and part-time)
DHS	244
DOJ	111
Others	10

## Access to Classified Information

All fusion centers have at least one staff member with a clearance at the Secret level or higher



94.8% of fusion centers have access to either HSDN and/or FBI Net

91.6% of all SLTT fusion center personnel who need a clearance have one; an additional 6.3% have requested a clearance

10.1% of SLTT fusion center personnel have Top Secret clearance and Sensitive Compartmented Information access, and such systems are located at 12 fusion centers

## Multidisciplinary Participation in Fusion Center Governance



## Collocation

69 fusion centers are collocated with another agency



## Multidisciplinary Participation in Fusion Liaison Officer Programs



Discipline	2014	2015	% Change
Law Enforcement	67	68	1.5%
EMS	40	45	12.5%
Emergency Management	53	54	1.9%

Fusion centers developed **137 collaborative and distributable analytic products** with other fusion centers and with federal partners during the 2015 Assessment period.




## Maturity Model

The National Network has fully developed over the five years that DHS has conducted the Assessment. Under the National Network Maturity Model (Maturity Model) applied to the National Network under the FCPP, the National Network has grown from its initial assessment as “Fundamental” in 2011 to its culminating status as “Mature” in 2015.

The Maturity Model is a multistage framework designed to evaluate and categorize the overall progress of the National Network as a whole—as opposed to individual fusion centers—in achieving the COCs and ECs.

The Maturity Model consists of 46 attributes aligned to four distinct stages: Fundamental, Emerging, Enhanced, and Mature. For each stage of the Maturity Model, the fusion center stakeholder community established an outcome-oriented, qualitative definition and aligned capability attributes based on each attribute’s contribution to the defined outcome for that maturity stage. The National Network advances through each of the four stages of the Maturity Model when 75% of fusion centers achieve all of the attributes associated with that level of the Maturity Model.



Being at the Mature stage means the National Network has the full capability to leverage the collective resources among individual fusion centers and adjust to both the changing threat environment and evolving requirements. Going forward the network can now measure itself not on how it has developed capabilities but on how it uses those capabilities to create measureable outcomes.

## Achievement of Outcomes: 2011-2015

The following section includes significant findings for the last five years all aligned to seven outcomes that represent the value of the National Network, as well as federal support to the National Network. Achievement of these outcomes represents the value of the National Network for its customers and allows fusion centers to demonstrate their influence on the Homeland Security Enterprise.<sup>9</sup> These outcomes enable public safety officials, first responders, and law enforcement personnel to do their jobs more effectively and provide decision makers with knowledge to guide resource allocation at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

### Better Targeted Information Gathering, Analysis and Dissemination

The National Network’s strides in improving information sharing can be seen in its gathering, analysis and dissemination of information. Since 2013 the number of analytic products and situational awareness products fusion centers developed and disseminated increased by 131.6% and 261.8%, respectively. In addition, fusion center production showed a marked increase in 2015 vs. 2014 in analytic products written (88.6%) and particularly in situational awareness products produced (228.0%). Eighty-seven percent of fusion centers have a process for verifying the delivery of these products to its customers, up dramatically from 30.6% in 2011 and up ten points from 76.6% in 2014.

<sup>9</sup> The Homeland Security Enterprise encompasses the federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private sector entities and individuals, families, and communities who share a common national interest in the safety and security of America and the American population.

Fusion centers provide the most benefit and have the greatest impact when their products and services align directly to the defined needs of their key customers and stakeholders. The use of Standing Information Needs (SINs), which are enduring subjects of intelligence or operational interest for an entity or jurisdiction, helps intelligence consumers quickly and easily research and retrieve products of interest and provides a basis for understanding whether specific topics are receiving appropriate analytic attention. DHS uses SINs to identify and track customer needs across the department, identifying them as the Homeland Security (HSEC) SINs. Fusion centers also define their own SINs to categorize customer needs within their AOR and to provide information and analysis that directly responds to these needs; they are approved by the fusion center's appropriate governing body or management entity. Utilizing fusion center-specific SINs provides a basis for tracking overall production and the extent to which fusion center customers' needs are being met.

During the 2015 Assessment reporting period, 78.9% of all fusion center analytic production addressed either a homeland security topic or fusion center customer need. Specifically, 69.2% of the products addressed HSEC SINs; in 2014, 41.2% of fusion center products did so. As for analytic products that address fusion center customer needs, 66.3% of products addressed stakeholders' needs within the fusion center's area of responsibility, compared with 62.5% in 2014.

## Improved Systemic Intelligence Capabilities

Foundational documentation is necessary to guide operations, enabling fusion centers to execute the fusion process consistently over time and under a variety of circumstances. For two consecutive years, all fusion centers have had approved plans, policies, or SOPs for each of the four COCs and a P/CRCL policy. Additional significant growth areas from 2011 to 2015 include: 96.1% of fusion centers have a formal communications plan to its stakeholders, up significantly from 41.7% in 2011; 97.4% of centers have a structured customer feedback mechanism for its analytic products, up from 59.4% in 2011; and 96.1% of fusion centers have approved strategic plans, up from 48.6% in 2011.

As of 2015, all fusion centers have established a primary sensitive-but-unclassified mechanism for disseminating time-sensitive information and products to its customers and partners, up from 55.6% in 2011.

### Significant Field-Level Coordination

In response to a Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommendation, the December 2015 *Report on the Coordination Between Field-Based Information Sharing Entities* found significant field-level coordination is occurring between fusion centers, Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) Centers, and High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Investigative Support Centers. The report found that, "[p]articipation by state and local executives—particularly police chiefs and state police colonels—in fusion center, RISS Center and HIDTA governance bodies indicates that policy coordination is occurring at the most senior levels."

## Improved Support to Operational Response

The 2015 Assessment captured data regarding fusion center support to preplanned events and no-notice incidents to better understand the fusion centers' role across the range of homeland security mission areas as outlined in the *National Preparedness Goal*.<sup>10</sup> A total of 314 special events occurred in fusion center AORs during the assessment period, up significantly from 2014, an increase of 67.9% (127 events).<sup>11</sup> One or more fusion centers provided direct or

<sup>10</sup> <https://www.fema.gov/national-preparedness-goal>

<sup>11</sup> The Assessment specifically asked fusion centers about their support of two types of special events: (1) National Special Security Events, which are events of national significance designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security that, by virtue of their political, economic, social, or religious significance, may be the target of terrorism or other criminal activity (events include presidential inaugurations, major international summits held in the United States, major sporting events, and presidential nominating conventions), and (2) Special Event Assessment Rating events, which are those preplanned special events below the level of National Special Security Events that have been submitted via the annual

indirect support in 248 of these events, an increase of 55.0% (88 events). Additionally, one or more fusion centers provided direct or indirect support to 84.9% (45) of the 53 federally declared disasters, up from 67.6% (46) the prior year. Direct support includes conducting and participating in incident-related threat and vulnerability assessments, deploying personnel to event or incident sites and operations centers, and managing incident-related requests for information (RFIs). Indirect support includes threat briefings to personnel traveling to affected areas, a variety of threat assessments, situational awareness of potentially impacted critical infrastructure, and briefs to partners.

**Enriched Partnerships and Decision Making**

In order to evaluate the value and impact of the fusion center products and services developed by fusion centers, DHS worked with partner agencies to survey Homeland Security Advisors, heads of state police and investigative agencies, major city police chiefs and major county sheriffs, state emergency management directors, and Special Agents in Charge at FBI field offices located within fusion center AORs. As opposed to surveys connected to specific products, this survey aimed at evaluating the overall satisfaction of key customers over the assessment period.

Satisfaction increased across all key customers, with overall customer satisfaction increasing from 68.7% to 74.3%. The most significant gain was found in the number of survey participants that reported fusion center products and services influenced their decision making related to threat response activities, increasing from 59.7% to 70.9%. Table 6 below contains overall responses to all survey questions.

**Table 6: 2015 Customer Satisfaction**

Question	Agree/ Strongly Agree	Neutral	Disagree/ Strongly Disagree
Fusion center products and services are timely for my mission needs	79.3%	14.5%	6.2%
Fusion center products and services are relevant	84.9%	11.6%	3.4%
I am satisfied with fusion center products and services	74.3%	16.7%	9.0%
Fusion center products and services influenced my decision making related to threat response activities within my area of responsibility	70.9%	19.1%	9.9%
Fusion center products and services resulted in increased situational awareness of threats within my area of responsibility	86.0%	7.7%	6.3%
Fusion center products and services are unique (information or service that could not be obtained through other means)	71.3%	20.3%	7.6%

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National Special Event Data Call. The majority of these events are state and local events that may require support augmentation from the federal government.

## More Effective Law Enforcement Activities

The National Network has demonstrated that it is not only capable but is actively impacting the national homeland security mission space and national law enforcement activities. Specifically, fusion centers have demonstrated the following:

- A 16.6% increase since 2013 in the number of Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) vetted and submitted by fusion centers that resulted in the initiation or enhancement of an FBI investigation;
- A 10.5% increase since 2013 in the number of SARs that result in a Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) Watchlist encounter;
- A near-doubling in fusion centers contributing to national-level risk assessments (from 52.8% in 2011 to 100% in 2015); and
- An increase from 63.6% in 2013 to 75.0% in 2015 in the percentage of fusion center responses to RFIs from the TSC that provided information for a TSC case file.

Fusion center reporting generally also increased substantially in 2015, with the number of SARs vetted and submitted by fusion centers that resulted in a TSC Watchlist encounter increasing by 48.0% over 2014 and the percentage of RFIs from the TSC for which fusion centers provided information for a TSC case file increasing from 65.1% to 75.0% in the same period. Although the percentage of SARs vetted and submitted by fusion centers in 2015 that resulted in the initiation or enhancement of an investigation by the FBI decreased from 5.5% in 2014 to 3.2% in 2015, the total number of SARs submitted by fusion centers increased by 60.9% from 2014.

## Enhanced Threat and Domain Awareness

To provide stakeholders with both general domain awareness and the more specific, accurate threat picture that allows them to make resource decisions to ultimately anticipate and disrupt criminal and terrorist activities, fusion centers must develop, leverage, and share information or intelligence to provide stakeholders with an accurate threat picture.

The 2015 Assessment shows that the National Network consistently demonstrates high achievement in these core capabilities. In addition to 97.4% of fusion centers having conducted threat assessments for customers within their AOR (no change from 2014), all 77 fusion centers (100%) contributed to a Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA), up from 74 (94.9%) in 2014. The number of fusion centers that contributed to and/or conducted a statewide risk assessment also increased, up from 74 (96.1%) in 2014 to 76 (98.7%).

Finally, 100% of fusion centers have a plan, policy, or SOP that addresses the receipt and handling of National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) alerts, up from 59.7% in 2011, and 100% have a plan, policy, or SOP that addresses the dissemination of NTAS alerts to its stakeholders, up from 52.8% under the first Assessment.

## Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties Protections

A critical element of the National Network's maturity is its demonstrated focus on protecting and respecting individuals' privacy, civil rights and civil liberties (P/CRCL). In 2015 79.2% of fusion centers had a formal P/CRCL outreach plan, up from just 23.6% in 2011 and 72.7% in 2014. Moreover, the National Network has made good use of this mature capability, with 100% of fusion center analytic products reviewed for P/CRCL issues prior to dissemination, up from just 57.0% in 2013.

The ever changing nature of technology will require that fusion centers update and maintain their privacy, civil rights and civil liberties protections and associate policies. Technologies like social media research tools, license plate readers, and facial recognition technologies can have significant intelligence and investigative benefit, although not all fusion centers have access to or choose to use these tools. Currently, 74.0% (57) of fusion centers have policies to address social media research tools, 45.5% (35) for license plate readers, and 32.5% (25) for facial recognition technologies.

## Federal Support to the National Network

Federal agencies provide support to state and locally owned and operated fusion centers through grant funding, training, technical assistance, exercises, federal personnel, and access to federal information and networks. Data collected through the 2015 Assessment was coupled with a data call to federal departments and agencies to understand the levels and types of resources collectively leveraged to support fusion centers.

DHS determined the highest-priority gap mitigation activities for 2015 by comparing the top ten-rated activities for the past and the future 12-month periods based on total score and on the instances in which the activities were rated most effective or most important. Eight of the top ten activities are training or educational programs, including:

- Basic Intelligence and Threat Analysis Course
- Open Source Intelligence Training
- Fusion Center Leaders Program
- Mid-Level Intelligence and Threat Analysis Course
- Cyber Analysis Training Course
- Fusion Center Exchange Program
- Principles of Intelligence Writing and Briefing Course
- MindLeap Critical Thinking

The other two top-ten activities relate to Secret-level clearances and access to Secret-level systems. The federal government will continue to focus its support for fusion centers on the development and delivery of gap mitigation resources that will help fusion centers obtain and sustain the knowledge, skills, and tools necessary to execute the fusion process, including the priority activities listed above and other activities.

## Federal Cost Inventory

DHS collected the appropriate data and developed the 2015 Fusion Center Federal Cost Inventory report in order to document federal funding and personnel supporting fusion centers for FY 2015, delineating resources provided in accordance with guidelines set in the Federal Resource Allocation Criteria Policy.

The 2015 Fusion Center Federal Cost Inventory reveals a significant level of federal investment in fusion centers, particularly in the form of personnel deployed directly to fusion centers, training and technical assistance, and information technology deployed in support of fusion centers. However, comparisons with federal investment data from 2011 to 2015 also highlight how federal departments and agencies have refined and focused the type and level of support they provide to the National Network.

Noteworthy trends revealed through year-to-year comparisons include:

- Direct federal support decreased steadily over the period, from \$97.5 million in 2011 to \$68.5 million in 2015.

- Federal grants expended by SLTT agencies increased over the period, from \$52.3 million to \$63.7 million, peaking at \$75.3 million in 2012.

## Homeland Security Grant Program Requirements

The FY 2015 Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP), administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Grant Programs Directorate, plays an important role in the implementation of Presidential Policy Directive 8 by supporting the development and sustainment of core capabilities. Core capabilities are essential for the execution of each of the five mission areas outlined in the *National Preparedness Goal* (NPG).

The development and sustainment of these core capabilities are not exclusive to any single level of government or organization but rather require the combined effort of the whole community. Intelligence and information sharing is identified in the NPG as a core capability, and the *National Prevention Framework* further identifies those capabilities, plans, and operations necessary to ensure that the nation has established the ability to collect, analyze, and further disseminate intelligence.

To support the development and sustainment of these capabilities, the FY 2015 HSGP guidance identified the maturation and enhancement of fusion centers as one of the priority areas for HSGP funding. DHS identified fusion center-specific requirements necessary to support this priority area and used the 2015 Assessment to collect data to evaluate compliance.

Following completion of the 2015 Assessment, DHS analyzed assessment data to evaluate compliance status for all fusion centers—looking at the FY 2015 grant requirements implemented in the middle of the assessment period as well as those requirements enacted in previous years. Two fusion centers were noncompliant with an existing requirement for both the 2014 and 2015 assessment periods. DHS informed fusion center leaders of any instances in which new or existing requirements were not met in the 2015 Assessment so that the fusion centers could take appropriate actions to achieve the requirement in the 2016 assessment period.

**Table 7: 2015 HSGP Requirements Compliance**

2015 HSGP Requirements	2014		2015	
	%	#	%	#
Successful completion of the annual Fusion Center Assessment Program managed by the DHS I&A. The Fusion Center Assessment Program evaluates each Fusion Center against the COCs and ECs and is comprised of the self-assessment questions, staffing, product, and cost assessment data tables, and validation.	100	78	100	77
Maintain approved plans, policies, or SOPs and, per the Fusion Center Assessment Program, and, when applicable, demonstrate improvement in each of the four COCs.	100	78	100	77
Develop and implement privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties (P/CRCL) protections, including:				
Maintaining an approved P/CRCL policy that is determined to be at least as comprehensive as the ISE Privacy Guidelines	100	78	100	77
Ensuring the approved P/CRCL policy is publicly available	97.4	76	100	77
Conducting a compliance review of their P/CRCL policy in accordance with the P/CRCL Compliance Verification for the Intelligence Enterprise	100.0	78	100	77
Ensuring there is a process in place for addressing and adjudicating complaints alleging violations of P/CRCL	100	78	100	77
Ensuring all analytic products (as defined by the annual assessment process) are reviewed for P/CRCL issues prior to dissemination	100	78	100	77

2015 HSGP Requirements	2014		2015	
	%	#	%	#
Ensuring all staff receive annual training on the center's P/CRCL policies	100	78	100	77
Ensuring all staff are trained on 28 CFR Part 23	100	78	100	77
Ensuring all Federally funded criminal intelligence databases comply with 28 CFR Part 23	100	78	100	77
All fusion center analytic personnel must meet designated competencies, as identified in the Common Competencies for State, Local, and Tribal Intelligence Analysts, that have been acquired through experience or training courses.	97.4	76	96.1	74
Successfully complete an exercise to evaluate the implementation of the COCs at least once every two years and address any corrective actions arising from the successfully completed exercises within the timeframe identified in the each exercises' AAR.	100	78	100	77
Post 100 percent (100%) of distributable analytic products (as defined by the annual assessment process) to HSIN-Intel as well as any other applicable portals, such as LEO, RISS, their agency portal, etc.	83.3	65	88.3	68
Ensure all analytic products are tagged to Homeland Security Standing Information Needs.*	69.2	54	94.8	73
Have formalized process (as defined by the annual assessment process) to track incoming and outgoing requests for information (RFI), including send/recipient and actions taken.	100	78	100	77
For States that have multiple designated fusion centers, the primary fusion center has documented a plan that governs the coordination and interactions of all fusion centers within the state.	100	12	100	12
Provide responses to all RFIs received from the FBI Terrorist Screening Center.	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD
Have formalized governance or oversight body with appropriate partner representation.	97.4	76	96.1	74
Conduct or contribute to the Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment for their area of responsibility.	94.9	74	100	77
All fusion centers that provide case support must conduct event deconfliction of all significant investigative information using one of the following systems: RISSafe, Case Explorer, or SAFETNet.*			100	77

\* Requirement introduced in the FY 2014 HSGP Guidance. All other requirements were introduced in prior HSGP Guidance.

## Recommendations

As the results of the 2015 Assessment demonstrate, the National Network has developed and matured since 2011. It now possesses the fundamental capabilities to execute its mission. Based on the above Findings, the following recommendations are presented to guide the National Network toward maximizing its impact in its critical information sharing mission:

### **Recommendation 1: Sustainment of foundational capabilities across the National Network must be maintained.**

Fusion centers have achieved almost all of the attributes that are critical to successful execution of the fusion process. The National Network has demonstrated the ability to leverage the collective resources among individual fusion centers and adjust to both the changing threat environment and evolving requirements. The outcomes that result from fusion center implementation of the intelligence cycle will be based on these foundational capabilities. To maintain this level of capability, foundational plans, policies, and SOPs must be periodically reviewed and updated; processes and mechanisms must also be reevaluated and adjusted.

**Recommendation 2: Fusion centers have consistently implemented privacy, civil rights and civil liberties protections, but must work to maintain and enhance these protections as threats and technologies change.**

Since 2011 the percentage of fusion centers having a formal P/CRCL outreach plan has increased dramatically, from 23.6% in 2011 to 79.2% in 2015. Reflecting DHS's commitment to protecting these fundamental rights, fusion centers should continue to update and maintain their privacy protections and associated policies to respond to technologies like social media research tools, license plate readers, and facial recognition systems that can have significant intelligence and investigative benefit, although not all fusion centers have access to or choose to use these tools.



# The Way Ahead

Since its inception in 2011, the FCPP's goal has been to help fusion centers develop foundational capabilities by implementing plans, policies, or SOPs.

This year marks the close out of the capability phase of the FCPP. The 2015 Assessment found an average score of 98 out of 100—up from 76.8 in 2011. With this score the National Network has successfully reached the “mature stage” under the FCPP Maturity Model, signifying that it has developed and implemented the fundamental plans, policies and capabilities that serve as the platform for future progress.

Because of this progress, DHS looks to transition to a new performance framework that demonstrates the impact and value of the National Network, highlighting successes and identifying potential areas of growth. DHS has engaged with a working group of fusion center directors to develop this new framework that balances data sensitivities with the need to demonstrate performance, including what data is collected and how it is collected. This new framework will apply a restructured set of performance measures—captured at the National Network level—against which individual fusion centers will also be able to measure their progress, strengths and weaknesses, all focused on outcomes of fusion center activities and their impact on protecting the homeland. These enhanced performance measures will help individual fusion centers highlight successes and identify growth areas to bring the right resources—including training, personnel and policies—to make steady and visible progress. The way ahead will also include fewer measures applied to the National Network as a whole than the FCPP currently has, with the goal of reducing and streamlining the network-wide measures to make them easier for the fusion centers to apply.

Working from the solid foundation of mature capabilities, this focused performance measures approach going forward will enable the fusion centers to concentrate their energy and resources to maximize their role as a focal point within the state and local environment for the receipt, analysis, gathering and sharing of threat-related information.

# Appendix A – Critical Operational Capabilities and Enabling Capabilities Attribute Table

	2014		2015*	
	Total Achieved	Percent Achieved	Total Achieved	Percent Achieved
<b>COC 1 Receive</b>				
1. Fusion center has approved plans, policies, or standard operating procedures (SOPs) for the receipt of federally-generated threat information	78	100%	77	100%
2. Fusion center has a plan, policy, or SOP that addresses the receipt and handling of National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) alerts	77	98.7%	77	100%
3. Fusion center personnel with a need to access classified information are cleared to at least the Secret level	78	100%	77	100%
4. Fusion center has access to sensitive but unclassified information systems	78	100%	77	100%
5. Fusion center has access to HSDN and/or FBINet (i.e., within fusion center or on-site)	71	91.0%	73	94.8%
<b>COC 2 Analyze</b>				
1. Fusion center has approved plans, policies, or SOPs for assessing the local implications of time-sensitive and emerging threat information	78	100%	77	100%
2. Fusion center has a documented analytic production plan	72	92.3%	72	93.5%
3. Fusion center has access to multidisciplinary subject matter experts (SMEs) within its AOR to inform analytic production	78	100%	77	100%
4. Fusion center has access to multidisciplinary SMEs outside of its AOR to inform analytic production	78	100%	77	100%

	2014		2015*	
	Total Achieved	Percent Achieved	Total Achieved	Percent Achieved
5. Fusion center has a process to provide DHS with information and/or intelligence that offers a local context to threat information in the event of an NTAS-related alert	78	100%	77	100%
6. Fusion center conducts threat assessments within its AOR	76	97.4%	75	97.4%
7. Fusion center contributes to or conducts a statewide risk assessment (threat, vulnerability, and consequence analysis)	74	94.9%	76	98.7%
8. Fusion center contributes to national-level risk assessments	72	92.3%	77	100%
9. Fusion center has a structured customer feedback mechanism for some or all of its analytic products	71	91.0%	75	97.4%
10. Fusion center evaluates the effectiveness of the customer feedback mechanism for analytic products on an annual basis	75	96.2%	75	97.4%
11. All fusion center analysts have received at least 20 hours of issue-specific training in the past 12 months	75	96.2%	75	97.4%
<b>COC 3 Disseminate</b>				
1. Fusion center has approved plans, policies, or SOPs governing the procedures and communication mechanisms for the timely dissemination of products to customers within its AOR	78	100%	77	100%
2. Fusion center has a dissemination matrix	72	92.3%	73	94.8%
3. Fusion center has a primary sensitive but unclassified mechanism to disseminate time-sensitive information and products to their customers and partners	78	100%	77	100%
4. Fusion center has a plan, policy, or SOP that addresses dissemination of NTAS alerts to stakeholders within its AOR	77	98.7%	77	100%
5. Fusion center has a mechanism to disseminate NTAS alerts	77	98.7%	77	100%
6. Fusion center has a process for verifying the delivery of products to intended customers	60	76.9%	67	87.0%
<b>COC 4 Gather</b>				
1. Fusion center is Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI) compliant OR has an approved plan, policy, or SOP governing the gathering of locally-generated information	78	100%	77	100%
2. Fusion center has a documented tips and leads process	76	97.4%	75	97.4%
3. Fusion center has a process for identifying and managing information needs	78	100%	77	100%
4. Fusion center has a process for managing the gathering of locally-generated information to satisfy the fusion center's information needs	78	100%	77	100%
5. Fusion center has approved standing information needs (SINs)	71	91.0%	74	96.1%
6. Fusion center has an annual process to review and refresh its SINs	76	97.4%	76	98.7%
7. Fusion center has a request for information (RFI) management process	78	100%	77	100%
8. Fusion center has a process to inform DHS of protective measures implemented within its AOR in response to an NTAS alert	76	97.4%	77	100%

	2014		2015*	
	Total Achieved	Percent Achieved	Total Achieved	Percent Achieved
<b>EC 1 Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties Protections</b>				
1. Fusion center has a P/CRCL policy determined by DHS to be at least as comprehensive as the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) Privacy Guidelines	78	100%	77	100%
2. Fusion center provides formal and standardized training to all personnel on the fusion center's P/CRCL policy and protections annually	78	100%	77	100%
3. Fusion center policies, processes, and mechanisms for receiving, cataloging, and retaining information (provided to the center) comply with 28 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 23 when appropriate	78	100%	77	100%
4. Fusion center trains all personnel who access criminal intelligence systems in 28 CFR Part 23	78	100%	77	100%
5. Fusion center has identified a P/CRCL Officer	78	100%	77	100%
6. Fusion center has a P/CRCL outreach plan	56	71.8%	61	79.2%
<b>EC 2 Sustainment Strategy</b>				
1. Fusion center has an approved strategic plan	73	93.6%	74	96.1%
2. Fusion center conducts an annual financial audit	72	92.3%	71	92.2%
3. Fusion center completes an annual operational cost assessment	77	98.7%	77	100%
4. Fusion center participates in an exercise at least once a year	78	100%	77	100%
5. Fusion center measures its performance to determine the effectiveness of its operations relative to expectations it or its governing entity has defined	73	93.6%	75	97.4%
<b>EC 3 Communications and Outreach</b>				
1. Fusion center has a designated Public Information Officer or Public Affairs Officer	77	98.7%	76	98.7%
2. Fusion center has an approved communications plan	70	89.7%	74	96.1%
3. Fusion center has developed and implemented a process for capturing success stories	78	100%	77	100%
<b>EC 4 Security</b>				
1. Fusion center has an approved security plan, policy, or SOP that addresses physical, personnel, and information security	76	97.4%	75	97.4%
2. Fusion center trains all personnel on the fusion center's security plan annually	73	93.6%	72	93.5%
3. Fusion center has identified a Security Liaison	77	98.7%	77	100%
4. Fusion center's Security Liaison (or other organization's Security Liaison) completes annual security training	76	97.4%	75	97.4%
5. Fusion center has access to Central Verification System (CVS)	63	80.8%	71	92.2%
6. Fusion center's Security Liaison (or other organization's Security Liaison) is trained on how to use CVS	67	85.9%	71	92.2%

\*Although there were 78 centers in both periods, only 77 responded to the 2015 Assessment.

